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Abstract Aim To estimate the price sensitivity of consumer choice of health insurance
ﬁrm. Method Using paneldata of the ﬂows of insured between pairs of Dutch sickness funds
during the period 1993–2002, we estimate the sensitivity of these ﬂows to differences in
insurance premium. Results The price elasticity of residual demand for health insurance
was low during the period 1993–2002, conﬁrming earlier ﬁndings based on annual changes
in market share. We ﬁnd small but significant elasticities for basic insurance but insig-
nificant elasticities for supplementary insurance. Young enrollees are more price sensitive
than older enrollees. Conclusion Competition was weak in the market for health insurance
during the period under study. For the market-based reforms that are currently under way,
this implies that measures to promote competition in the health insurance industry may be
needed.
Keywords Health insurance · Consumer choice · Price elasticity
JEL Classiﬁcations D12 · I11 · I18 · L11
Introduction
Competition between health insurance ﬁrms is a central pillar of the market-based reforms
which are currently being introduced in the Dutch health care sector. Hence it is important
to have a good idea of the extent of competition in the market for health insurance. Earlier
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research (summarised below) has indicated that competition among health insurance ﬁrms
is rather weak. If this continues to be the case in more recent years, then additional measures
to stimulate competition in this market may be called for.
In this paper we present new empirical estimates of an indicator of competition, the
elasticity of residual demand for health insurance. This elasticity measures the loss in market
share of a health insurer as a consequence of a unilateral increase in price, assuming other
ﬁrmskeeptheirpricesconstant.Theelasticityofresidualdemandisanimportantdeterminant
of the level of competition. If this elasticity is small, then insurers will be able to set prices
substantially higher than marginal costs.
Our estimates are based on a dataset covering all Dutch citizens who obtained health
insurance through one of the 20 sickness funds in 2002 (about 60% of total population). We
constructedasetofpaneldatabyexploitingthefactthathealthinsurershadaregionalmonop-
oly prior to the introduction of competition in 1993. We use this initial setting to construct
bilateral ﬂows of insured during 1993–2002 between each pair of health insurance ﬁrms in
our dataset. Regressing these bilateral ﬂows on price differences between each pair of health
insurance ﬁrms allows us to estimate price elasticities of residual demand. The advantage of
using this dataset over previous work that relied on time series of market shares per ﬁrm, is
that we are able to estimate differences in price elasticity for many different subgroups of
the population. Another advantage is that looking at bilateral ﬂows (rather than aggregate
market shares) gives us sufﬁcient degrees of freedom to correct (at least to some extent) for
unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some background on the
Dutch system of health insurance. Section “Health insurance in the Netherlands” summa-
risesexistingestimatesofthepriceelasticityofhealthinsuranceintheNetherlandsandsome
other countries. Section “Literature review” describes the data and the estimation method.
Section “Data and method” presents estimation results. Section “Results” uses these results
to calculate elasticities of residual demand. Section “Conclusions” concludes.
Health insurance in the Netherlands
The institutional setting before the reforms
Until 2006, the Dutch market for health insurance was split into two segments, distinguished
mainly by income of the insured. The ﬁrst segment, covering about 60% of the population,
consisted of compulsory insurance for workers and their dependents with incomes below
a certain threshold (2005: euro 32,600). This segment was served exclusively by so-called
sickness funds: not-for-proﬁt health insurers. Private insurers were not allowed to operate in
this part of the market; these ﬁrms had to focus their activities exclusively on the part of the
population with incomes above the income threshold of euro 32,600. Health care providers
were heavily regulated, with respect to prices as well as entry. The regulatory regime differs
in important respects between the two segments of the health insurance market. Sickness
funds face a number of restrictions that mostly do not apply to private for-proﬁt insurers. In
particular, sickness funds must:
• Offer a basic insurance policy, the coverage of which is determined by the government;
• contract with every hospital;
• take part in the risk-equalisation scheme run by the government;
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• accepteverycitizenatthesamenominalpremium(communityrating)forbasicinsurance,
irrespective of expected health costs, during annual open enrolment periods.
It is important to stress that the insurance mandate, the legally standardized beneﬁts, the
open enrollment requirement and the system of risk equalization largely eliminate adverse
selection. In the presence of adverse selection, premium differences would not only be a
cause but also a consequence of switching by the insured. For example, those at risk for
high health care costs might choose an insurer with more generous coverage. This type of
selection would have seriously complicated the estimation of price elasticities.
AnotherimplicationofthefeaturesoftheDutchhealthinsurancesetting isthattheclassic
supply/demandidentiﬁcationproblemdoesnotarise.Marketsupplyisdeterminedbythesize
of the population given the fact that insurance is mandatory, while individual insurers have
to accept any paying customer and to offer him/her the same coverage. In effect, quantity is
not a choice variable for an individual insurer.
As far as basic insurance is concerned, sickness funds were ﬁnanced partly through
income-related premiums set by the government, and partly by so-called nominal premi-
ums set by the sickness funds themselves and paid out-of-pocket by the insured. In 2005 the
nominalpremiumaccountedforabout15–20%ofthetotalpremium.Byvaryingthenominal
premium, sickness funds were able to compete on price in the market for basic insurance.
Sickness funds also sold supplementary insurance but via a separate legal entity, covering
interaliadentalcare,physicaltherapyandalternativemedicine.Noneoftheaboverestrictions
applied to supplementary insurance. Sickness funds had to cover the costs of supplementary
insurance entirely out of their premium income.
Basic insurance and supplementary insurance: tied sales?
In the Netherlands, the overwhelming majority of sickness funds enrolees (over 90%) also
bought voluntary supplementary insurance for health costs not covered by basic insurance.
As alreadypointedout,openenrolment did(nordoes) notapplytosupplementary insurance.
Moreover,almostallﬁrmsrestrictedsupplementaryinsurancetothoseinsuredwhopurchase
their basic policy from the same ﬁrm (Schut et al. 2004). This suggests that most enrolees
choseahealthinsureronthebasisofthepriceforthetotalpackage(basicplussupplementary
insurance). However, because of the lack of transparency of the market for supplementary
insurance due to the proliferation of different policies, enrolees may have attached a greater
weight to the price of basic insurance in their choice of sickness fund. For this reason, we
will not a priori assume that consumers based their choice of sickness fund on the price of
the total package (basic plus supplementary insurance).
The post-reform setting
In 2006 a major reform of the Dutch health care system was initiated. A new national health
insurance scheme was introduced in which the social and private segments of the health
insurance market were uniﬁed. All citizens have to buy standardized basic health insurance
coverage at a community rated premium from a private health insurance ﬁrm. Health insur-
ers have to accept all applicants and are compensated for enrollees with predictably high
costs by risk-adjusted premium subsidies. In addition, the government started with a creat-
ing more room for competition at the supply side of the health care market, by a gradual
deregulation of prices of hospitals, introducing more freedom for selective contracting of
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health providers by health insurers, and by improving the transparency of the market with
respect to price and quality (although with respect to the latter there is still a long way to go).
Taken together, these reforms imply a much greater role for market forces. Effective compe-
tition among health insurers is an important element of the reform, since this has to provide
insurers with appropriate incentives to act as a prudent purchaser of care on behalf of their
enrollees.
Literature review
Thepriceelasticityofresidualdemandisanimportantstatisticforgaugingthelevelofextent
of competition in a given market (Yang 2002). This elasticity measures the percentage drop
in market share in response to unilateral increase in price by one ﬁrm, keeping prices at all
other ﬁrms constant. Thus, the larger this elasticity (in absolute terms), the more competitive
the market.
In summarising the empirical literature on price elasticities of residual demand in health
insurance markets, it is important to stress that most studies look at the price elasticity of
demand with respect to the out-of-pocket premium (the part of the premium directly paid by
the insured). The out-of-pocket premium covers only a part of the insurance bill: the gov-
ernment and/or employers usually pay a substantial part of the premium. In the US, the
out-of-pocket premium usually covers only 10–20% of the total premium, in Germany
the share is about 50% while in the Netherlands, on average out-of-pocket premiums amount
to 10–15% of the total medical expenses (Schut and Hassink 2002). Because in the Neth-
erlands, employers and employees both pay an income-related amount irrespective of the
sickness fund chosen, consumers pay the full out-of-pocket price differential between health
insurers.ThisisdifferentfromthesituationinGermanywhereconsumerspayonlyapercent-
age of the price differential (Schut et al. 2003). In the US, there is a shift among employers
from a percentage contribution to a ﬁxed subsidy based on the cheapest health plan on the
menu. As a consequence, employees increasingly pay the full price differential among dif-
ferent plans.
Table 1 summarises recent estimates from the literature of the out-of-pocket elasticity
of residual demand in health insurance markets. Clearly, estimates differ widely, not only
between countries but also within countries. Elasticity estimates for the Netherlands are low
compared to Germany and the US. Indeed, raising the premium for basic insurance may be a
profitable strategy for an average sickness fund, at least in the short run (Schut and Hassink
2002).
We should stress that a comparison of estimated price elasticities of health plan choice in
different countries is not straightforward, because of different base levels of out-of-pocket
premiums and market shares. For instance, in Germany out-of-pocket premiums are at least
twice as high as the out-of-pocket premiums that typically paid by US employees with
employment-based group insurance. Due to the higher level of out-of-pocket premiums in
Germany the estimated price elasticities of plan choice in Germany are likely to be two to
ﬁve times as large as in the US. Also, the German estimates refer to the choice of type of
sickness fund, not to the choice of any speciﬁc sickness fund.
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Table 1 Out-of-pocket elasticities of demand for health insurance: literature survey
Author Period Elasticity
A. The Netherlands
Schut and Hassink (2002) basic Insurance 1996–1998 −0.3
Schut and Hassink (2002) supplementary insurance 1996–1998 −0.8
Schut and Hassink (2002) basic + supplementary insurance 1996–1998 −0.4
Schut et al. (2003)a 1996–2000 0.0–0.4
B. Germany
Schut et al. (2003)b 1996–2000 0.4–5.3
C. US
Strombom et al. (2002)c 1995 −0.2–1.7
Royalty and Solomon (1999)d 1994–1995 −0.1–1.5
a Mostestimatesareinsignificant,theonlyexceptionbeingpensionerswhereasignificantcoefﬁcientisfound
for supplementary insurance (the elasticity is −0.36)
b Posiitive elasticity applies to pensioners; not signiﬁcant
c Strombom et al. (2002) estimate total premium elasticities from which we have calculated out-of-pocket
premium elasticities; the highest elasticities apply to young and to newly hired workers
d Higher elasticities for younger, healthier workers; Royalty and Solomon (1999) also present much higher
estimates based on a model including ﬁxed effects. However, these are unrepresentative for the whole popu-
lation since ﬁxed effects logits can only be estimated on the part of the population that has actually switched
Data and method
The dependent variable
Starting point: individual cross-section data
For the purposes of this research we have obtained access to the complete records of all
10million Dutch citizens who were covered by one of the 20 sickness funds in 2002.1 This
dataset is maintained by Vektis, a private ﬁrm that is owned by the Dutch federation of health
insurers (ZN). For estimation purposes we have excluded children who do not choose their
own sickness fund, but are enrolled via their parents. This reduces the dataset to roughly
8.0million observations.
Transforming cross-section data into paneldata
Estimating a price elasticity from a single cross-section is problematic, since it will not be
possibletocorrectforunobservedﬁrm-speciﬁceffectswhichcouldbecorrelatedwithprices,
leading to a bias in the estimated coefﬁcient for price. However, we are able to transform
1 A small sickness fund, OZB, which worked exclusively for a large Dutch multinational company, is not
included in the analysis. Furthermore, some ﬁrms merged during the period 1993–2002. We assume that the
insured of the merged ﬁrms pay the premium of the largest of the merged ﬁrms. Using a weighted premium
of the merged ﬁrms would have been better, but for supplementary insurance this required identifying a com-
parable supplementary policy for the merged ﬁrms. We do not have sufﬁcient data to do this. For the ﬁrms
that we observe in 2002 we take heterogeneity of supplementary insurance into account by including ﬁrm
speciﬁc coefﬁcients. However, this solution cannot be used to correct for within-ﬁrm heterogeneity. For basic
insurance we checked whether including weighted premiums would alter our outcomes, and this turned out
not to be the case. Weighted premiums where almost identical to the premiums of the largest of the merged
ﬁrms, possibly because ﬁrms already coordinated their pricing behaviour prior to the formal merger. We also
did a sensitivity analysis by excluding the Amsterdam region where a merged ﬁrm is the dominant insurer.
This did not alter the estimation results either.
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a large part of our cross-section data into paneldata by exploiting the fact that until 1993,
each sickness fund had a designated geographical area in which it was the sole provider of
social health insurance. We make the following three assumptions (below we will return to
the realism of these assumptions):
• All individuals in our dataset have been insured by a sickness fund uninterruptedly during
the whole period 1993–2002 (not necessarily the same sickness fund).
• No individual in our dataset has moved between regions during the period 1993–2002.
• Individuals have switched at most once during the period 1993–2002.
Given these assumptions, it follows that in 1993 all individuals who are in our dataset in
2002, were insured by the monopolist sickness fund in their region of residence. Therefore,
individualswhowerestillinsuredbytheformerregionalmonopolistin2002canbeclassiﬁed
as non-switchers. On the other hand, individuals who are not insured by the former regional
monopolist must have switched from the former monopolist to their current insurer.
Dropping observations for which these assumptions are unlikely to hold: Unfortunately,
wedonotknowwhethersomeonewhoisinsuredbyasicknessfundin2002hadbeeninsured
by a sickness fund during the whole period. Indeed, for some groups in the population, it
is likely that a substantial share switched from private insurance to social health insurance.
For example, the self-employed were not covered by social health insurance until 2000.
Starting in 2000, this group also became legally obliged to buy insurance from one of the
sickness funds (Schut et al. 2003). Therefore, we omit the self-employed—about 300,000
observations—from our empirical analysis.
Something similar applies to the elderly (Schut and Hassink 2002). In 1997, about 90,000
privately insured elderly suddenly became entitled to social health insurance because of a
substantial increase in the income threshold below which they were eligible for social health
insurance. Therefore, we also omit the elderly (aged 65 and over in 2002)—about 1.5million
observations—fromourempiricalanalysis.Otherresearchindicatesthatpriceelasticitiesfor
the elderly are much lower than for workers (Buchmueller 2000). Note that since we will
estimate age-speciﬁc elasticise, omitting one age group will not bias the results.
Among the non-working of working age, many individuals have been working during
some years in the period 1993–2002, but lost their jobs, resulting in a fall in income. If this
fall in income led to an income below the threshold for sickness funds, then these individ-
uals became eligible for social health insurance. If these individuals chose another sickness
fund than the former regional monopolist, then our procedure would erroneously classify
this group as switchers. Thus, we leave out this groups as well.
Finally, most individuals below age 25 in 2002 were insured through their parents in
1993. If their parents were privately insured in 1993, and if these individuals chose another
sickness funds than the former regional monopolist, then this group is erroneously classiﬁed
as switchers. Therefore we also leave out this group. This leaves us with all observations on
workers aged 25–64. Since it is unlikely that workers have experienced a fall in income, it is
likely that these workers were insured by a sickness fund in 1993.2
2 There is one other group where similar problems might occur, but which we nevertheless include in our
empirical analysis since we believe that for this group the problem is fairly small. This group consists of
(mostly) women who re-entered the labour force. Some of these women may have been insured via their
husband’sprivateinsurancepolicybeforere-enteringthelabourforce.Afterre-enteringtheymayhavebecome
eligible for social health insurance. Of all working women between 0.5% and 1% are women who re-entered
the labour force during the previous year (calculated from data provided by Statistics Netherlands). Only a
minority of these women had husbands who were privately insured. Assuming this share to be equal to the
share in the population as a whole yields one-third. Thus, the annual number of women erroneously classiﬁed
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics: number of switchers 1993–2002, by age and gender (workers)
Age in 2002
25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 Row total
Women
Number of obs 605863 458189 297572 169258 1530882
Number of switchers 140638 74711 40014 20400 275763
Percentage of switchers 23.2 16.3 13.4 12.1 16.3
Men
Number of obs 585885 511814 367300 140393 1605392
Number of switchers 160247 114771 77702 24418 377138
Percentage of switchers 27.4 22.4 21.2 17.4 22.1
Total
Number of obs 1191748 970003 664872 309651 3136274
Number of switchers 300885 189482 117716 44818 652901
Percentage of switchers 25.3 19.4 17.3 14.7 19.2
Moving between regions: If an individual moves from one region to another but stays with
the same sickness fund, then our procedure results in erroneously classifying this individual
as a switcher. It has been reported that annual movements between regions amount to 0.2–
0.3% of all households enrolled in a sickness fund (Kalshoven 1999). Cumulated over 10
years this amounts to 2–3% of all households. This classiﬁcation error is fairly small given
that the percentage of switchers in our dataset is equal to roughly 20% of all households (see
below).
Identifying regions: In order to determine which ﬁrm was the regional monopolist for a
given individual, we used municipality codes. There are 496 municipalities in our dataset.
Within each municipality we identify the former monopolist on the basis of market share.
The largest ﬁrm is deﬁned as the former monopolist. This correctly identiﬁed which ﬁrm
was the former regional monopolist in most of the municipalities. However, the designated
regions did not always coincide exactly with municipality borders: in quite a few cases one
geographical area within a municipality was served by one ﬁrm while some other geograph-
ical area within the same municipality was served by another ﬁrm. In these cases, we will
incorrectly classify individuals who had been insured by the smaller of these sickness funds
as switchers or as non-switchers. Therefore, we used a cut-off point of 60%: if in a given
municipalitythelargestﬁrmhadamarketsharein2002of60%ormore,thenweincludedthe
municipality in the analysis, otherwise we omitted this municipality. In this way we exclude
most municipalities wherein1993therewas asecondlargesicknessfundsactive.3 Applying
this rule leads us to exclude 65 municipalities and a drop in the number of cases of about one
million. In section “Results” we discuss sensitivity analysis using another cut-off point.
Footnote 2 continued
as switcher amounts to only 0.2–0.3% at maximum. On the other hand, re-entrants are primarily found among
the 25–45 year old. Given that the percentage of female switchers in these age groups in our data is about
20% of all households (see below), this classiﬁcation error is fairly small.
3 As of 1999 the former regional monopolist still had a market share of 80% or more (De Bekker and Van den
Brink 2002). Extrapolating to 2002 would lead to a market share of 70–75%. Using this ratio of 2002 market
shares to 1993 markets shares (i.e. 3/4), a 2002 market share of 60% would correspond to a 1993 market share
of 80%. This would imply that, if in 1993 another ﬁrm was active in this municipality, its 1993 market cannot
have exceeded 20% (100–80%).
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Table 3 Switching 1993–2002:
bilateral ﬂows by age and gender,
% of total market
Source: see text
Age
25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
Women
Mean 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.7
SD 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.4
Men
Mean 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0
SD 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.8
Resulting dataset: If we follow the procedure just described, we obtain the dataset pre-
sented in Table 2. The table shows the total number of individuals in our dataset along with
the number of individuals who have ‘switched’ from one sickness fund to another in the
period 1993–2002, broken down by age (in 2002) and gender. Clearly the propensity to
switch depends on age (the young switch more) and gender (men are more likely to switch).
It also emerges quite clearly that the former regional monopolist still has a very large share
of this market: 81% (100–19.2%) on average.
From individual data to bilateral ﬂows
The paneldataset just created allows us to construct bilateral ﬂows (by age and gender) from
former regional monopolists to the sickness funds that have entered the region since 1993.
Of the 20 ﬁrms in our dataset in 2002, 15 had been a regional monopolist until 1993. Of the
other ﬁve ﬁrms, four entered the market since 1993 while one ﬁrm was active in 1993 but not
as a regional monopolist: it shared ‘ its’ region with another ﬁrm, so in that region there was
a duopoly. We omitted this region from our dataset since in case of a duopoly our procedure
for constructing paneldata breaks down.
With these numbers of ﬁrms, we can construct 15 × 19 = 285 bilateral ﬂows: from each
of 15 former regional monopolist to each of 19 other ﬁrms. Since we will calculate separate
ﬂows for men and women and for each of four age groups, the total dataset contains 2,280
observations. We will use these ﬂows from former regional monopolists to new entrants into
the regional market as our dependent variable. Note that this procedure implies that new
entrants can only gain customers. In order to adjust for differences in the size of the regional
markets, we will divide each ﬂow by the size of the total regional market in 2002.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the bilateral ﬂows that result from these calcula-
tions. Each entry in the table shows the average number of individuals who switched from a
former regional monopolist to another ﬁrm, as a percentage of the total size of the regional
marketfortherelevantage/gendergroupin2002.4 Toarriveattheaveragetotaloutﬂowfrom
a regional monopolist, each entry in the table must be multiplied by 19 (since each former
monopolistfacespotentialcompetitioninitsformerdesignatedregionfrom19otherﬁrms).5
4 Sincewearerestrictingourdatasettoinsuredwhowere(probably)continuouslyinsuredduring1993–2002,
the total market in 2002 was the same size as the total market in 1993.
5 Multiplying the ﬁgures in table 4.2. by 19 does not exactly reproduce the corresponding ﬁgures in table 4.1,
since outﬂow rates differ between regions and ﬁrms.
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Table 4 Construction of
premium variables
To ﬁrm From ﬁrm
12…1 5
1 – p1–p2 p1–p… p1–p15
2 p2–p1 – p2–p… p2–p15
… p…–p1 p…–p2 – p…–p15
20 p20–p1 p20–p2 p20–p… –
Explanatory variables
Prices
Our main interest is in the effect of differences in price between any two sickness funds on
switching between these two ﬁrms. In order to estimate this effect, we calculate for each
pair of ﬁrms the difference in premium between these ﬁrms. This is illustrated in Table 4.
Thus, our hypothesis is that a larger positive price differential between the incumbent (the
former monopolist) and a regional entrant (all other ﬁrms) will result in a larger ﬂow from
the incumbent to the entrant.
Until 1996 there was almost no premium variation among sickness funds. All sickness
funds charged the same premium for basic insurance of 90 euro’s. The reason for this was
that sickness funds were hardly at risk for the medical expenses of their enrollees. In 1996
the ﬁnancial risk for sickness funds was raised from 3% to 15% of the difference between
the expected and realized medical expenses of their enrollees (sickness funds received risk-
adjusted capitation payments for compensating most of the expected medical expenses).
Supplementary insurance played hardly a role until 1996. Starting in 1996 this changed
when dental care and physiotherapy where transferred from basic insurance to supplemen-
tary insurance.
Since our dependent variable does not consist of annual ﬂows but ﬂows of insured over a
10year period (1993–2002), we use the average price difference between each pair of ﬁrms
duringtheseyearsasanexplanatoryvariable.Weuseaveragepricesfortheyears1996–2002
since(asarguedabove)priorto1996switchingcannothavetakenplaceinresponsetoprice.6
The results of the procedure outlined in Table 4 are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Usingaveragepricesmayleadtoabiasinestimatedcoefﬁcients,sincedifferencesbetween
average prices will tend to be smaller than differences in annual prices. This suggests that
the bias is in the direction of overestimating the effect of prices: we are attributing observed
switching behavior to smaller price differences than the annual price differences confronting
the insured.7
6 One referee pointed out that it would have been preferable to base our calculations of ﬂows between sick-
ness funds on the same period, i.e. 1996–2002. However, we are unable to do this since we have to base
initial market shares on the 1993 institutional setting, as pointed out in the text. Nevertheless, our approach is
unlikely to bias our results, since price-induced ﬂows date from after 1996. Any ﬂows that took place in the
years 1993–1996 must be due to other factors than price. Using average price differences over 1996–2002 or
1993–2002 does not change our results since it only alters the scaling of the price differences shown in tables
4.4 and 4.5.
7 One referee pointed out that price changes of time may cancel out, while switching still leaves traces in the
data. This can only happen in case of non-linear response to price differences. If a price differential of x euros
alwaysleadstoypersonsswitchingthenthiswillnotarise.Non-lineareffectscannotberuledout,forexample
price differentials may have to be larger than some threshold in order to make switching worthwhile; below
this threshold no switching takes place. However, in our data we hardly see the type of price movement that
might lead to such non-linearity, namely large price differences between a pair of ﬁrm in one year followed
by a smaller price differentials in later years. Rather what we see is increasing price differentials over time.
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Table 7 Prices: average annual
premium 1996–2002 (euro)
Source: iBMG database on health
insurance premiums
(unpublished)
Sickness fund Basic insurance Supplementary Total
insurance
1 148.7 50.8 199.5
2 145.6 56.8 202.4
3 158.5 50.0 208.5
4 127.3 83.8 211.1
5 139.9 74.5 214.4
6 153.1 66.5 219.6
7 149.0 71.7 220.8
8 157.9 64.9 222.7
9 139.2 84.4 223.6
10 143.2 84.0 227.2
11 164.3 63.7 228.0
12 157.5 73.6 231.1
13 164.6 70.2 234.8
14 137.0 103.5 240.5
15 159.3 88.5 247.8
16 141.4 106.4 247.8
17 140.8 122.1 262.9
18 176.9 87.6 264.5
19 178.3 93.7 272.0
20 156.6 133.8 290.4
For basic insurance, prices of different insurers refer to exactly the same product so we
are dealing with a homogenous product. The coverage of the basic package is set by the
government and service levels play at most a limited role, since health providers send their
bills directly to sickness funds. Customers face no risk of slow reimbursement by sickness
funds. Schut and Hassink (2002) also argue that sickness funds offer a standardised product:
“Since sickness funds offer standardised beneﬁts and are only starting to employ managed
care activities, it is unlikely that price variation can be explained by differences in qual-
ity or efﬁciency in purchasing or organising medical care (Schut and Hassink 2002).” The
same does not apply to supplementary insurance, where comparing policies is hampered
by differences in coverage across policies and ﬁrms. We tried to solve this by selecting a
supplementary package that is more or less identical across insurers. This package includes
dental care for adults, physical therapy, and medical appliances such as spectacle-glasses
and hearing aids. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that price differences reﬂect
to some extent real differences in quality (i.e. coverage) across supplementary policies. It is
also possible that consumers interpret differences in these prices as indicators of differences
in quality, even if in reality this is not the case. In that case we could in theory ﬁnd a positive
elasticity of residual demand.
Table 7 shows average prices for basic insurance, supplementary insurance and the total
package. Note that price differentials are fairly small but not negligible. The maximum sav-
ings for the total package amount to about 100 euro per year. Since premium differentials
are fairly stable over time (see below), this implies that the present value of switching to a
cheaper fund could be substantial for some consumers.
Itisimportanttonotethatdifferencesinpricesbetweenﬁrmsarefairlystableovertime,in
the following sense: a ﬁrm that is relatively expensive in year t will also be relatively expen-
sive in year t+1. This applies to both basic and supplementary insurance; especially in the
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Table 8 Prices: correlation over time and coefﬁcient of variation
Correlation (t, t+1) Basic insurance
coefﬁcient of
variation
Correlation (t, t+1) Supplementary
insurance coefﬁcient
of variation
1996 0.58 1.90 NA 47.93
1997 0.98 9.54 0.96 43.20
1998 0.79 10.36 0.95 58.11
1999 0.91 7.45 0.98 55.90
2000 0.86 9.72 0.97 45.25
2001 0.82 15.69 0.95 50.17
2002 10.93 26.20
Source: Calculated from time series on prices
lattercasecorrelationsovertimeareveryhigh.Wealsonotethatthespreadinsupplementary
premiums is much larger than the spread in premiums for basic insurance as measured by the
coefﬁcient of variation (100×standard deviation/mean), possibly indicating heterogeneity
in the coverage of supplementary insurance (see Table 8). This suggests that it is important
to include ﬁrm speciﬁc coefﬁcients in the model to be estimated.
Age and gender
We included age and gender as explanatory variables. In addition, these variables were inter-
acted with the price variables in order to assess whether price elasticities depend on these
characteristics.
Firm speciﬁc constants
Apart from price, we include three sets of ﬁrm speciﬁc constants that should pick up unmea-
suredﬁrm-speciﬁceffectssuchasqualityofservice.Theseﬁrm-speciﬁceffectsareplausibly
correlated with price, in which case our estimates would be biased. We address this potential
problem as follows. First, we include a ﬁrm speciﬁc constant for each former monopolist
(αi). The constant for ﬁrm i is included if ﬁrm i is involved in a bilateral ﬂow as a former
monopolist. Second, we include a set of ﬁrm speciﬁc constants for ﬁrms that were not the
formermonopolistinaregion(αj).Thisﬁrmspeciﬁcconstantisincludedifﬁrm j isinvolved
in a bilateral ﬂow. Third, we include a dummy variable for new sickness funds (NEW).
The ﬁrm speciﬁc constants αi and αj cannot be included simultaneously. This is because
including both αi and αj would result in perfect collinearity between the ﬁrm speciﬁc effects
and price.
Equations to be estimated
We will estimate six different models: three models with total premium as the price variable
and three models with separate variables for the price of basic and supplementary insurance.
For each of these choices of price variables, we present results for a model without any of the
ﬁrm speciﬁc coefﬁcients deﬁned in section “Data and method”, with ﬁrm speciﬁc constants
for the former regional monopolist (αi) and with ﬁrm speciﬁc constants for entrants (αj). In
the ﬁrst case, we also include a separate dummy (NEW) for new ﬁrms (ﬁrms that were not
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active in any of the regional markets in 1993). In the second case, any effects of this dummy
are picked up by the ﬁrm speciﬁc coefﬁcients for entrants.
The ﬁrm speciﬁc constants in the latter two speciﬁcations are included in an attempt to
correct for unobserved differences (e.g. coverage, quality, service level) across ﬁrms that
might bias our results. To the extent that these differences are constant over time, including
these dummies will avoid bias in the coefﬁcients on price. However, we cannot exclude the
possibility that differences in quality or service level changed over time, in which case a
bias could still remain. This possibility arises mainly in the case of supplementary insurance,
since the basic insurance package is completely standardized across ﬁrms.
Recall that the classic identiﬁcation problem does not arise in this case: supply does
not depend on price, since ﬁrms have to accept every insured wiling to pay the insurance
premium.
The estimated equations with total premium as the price variable read as follows:
Fi→j,j =i = C + β1 · AGE · (Pj − Pi) + β2 · MALE · (Pj − Pi) + β3 · AGE
+ β4 · MALE + ε (1)
Fi→j,j =i = αi + γ1 · AGE · (Pj − Pi) + γ2 · MALE · (Pj − Pi) + γ3 · AGE
+ γ4 · MALE + γ5 · NEW + ε (2)
Fi→j,j =i = αj + τ1 · AGE · (Pj − Pi) + τ2 · MALE · (Pj − Pi) + τ3 · AGE
+ τ4 · MALE + ε (3)
where
Fi→j,j =i = The number of switchers from ﬁrm i to ﬁrm j during 1993–2002, as
a percentage of the total number of insured in the region where i was
the former regional monopolist (i = 1,...,15, j = 1,...,20).
C = Constant
αi = Firm speciﬁc constant for former regional monopolist i
αj = Firm speciﬁc constant for entrant j
NEW = Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if Fi→j,i =j concerns a ﬂow to
a new ﬁrm, 0 otherwise.
(Pj − Pi) = Total average premium entrant minus total average premium former
regional monopolist, over the period 1996–2002.
AGE = Set of four dummy-variables, one for each age class (25–34, 35–44,
45–54, 55–64). The dummy variable takes on the value 1 if Fi→j,i =j
consists of a ﬂow of switchers in the relevant age class, 0 otherwise.
MALE = A dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if Fi→j,i =j concerns a
ﬂow of male switchers, 0 otherwise.
ε = An i.i.d. error term.
The estimated equations with separate variables for the price of basic and supplementary
insurance are similar, except that we replace (Pj − Pi), by two other variables, (PB
j − PB
i )
and (PS
j − PS
i ) where B stands for basic insurance and S for supplementary insurance. Note
that we are including interaction terms with price for each age group. As a consequence, we
do not (indeed, we cannot) include price separately (i.e., not interacted). In effect, we allow
the coefﬁcient(s) on price to vary freely across age groups. Note also that we also impose the
effect of gender to raise or lower the whole age proﬁle of the price-coefﬁcient by the same
absoluteamount,irrespectiveofage.Allowingtheageproﬁleofthepricecoefﬁcienttodiffer
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between men and women in an unconstrained way leads to very similar results. Ideally, we
would also estimate the effect of other factors such as income and education. However this
is precluded due to a lack of data.
Calculating elasticities
Because of the way we constructed our dataset, calculating elasticities on the basis of the
estimated coefﬁcient is rather complicated. The elasticity we are looking for is deﬁned as
follows:
εi =
 Qi
 Pi
Pi
Qi,1993
(4)
where
 Qi = net change in the number of insured at ﬁrm i during the period 1993–2002.
Qi,1993 = the number of insured at ﬁrm i at the beginning of the period 1993–2002.
 Pi = change in the average price over the period 1996–2002 of ﬁrm i.
Pi = the average price over the period 1993–2002 of ﬁrm i.
Ifwedeﬁne Sijasthenumberofswitchersfromﬁrmi toﬁrm j,wecanreplace Qi/ Pi
in Eq. 4 by:
 Qi/ Pi =
⎡
⎣
j=20  
j=1,j =i
Sij −
k=15  
k=1,k =i
Ski
⎤
⎦/ Pi (5)
Equation 5 indicates that the change in the number of insured of ﬁrm i as a consequence of
raising its price, equals the change in each of the bilateral ﬂows in which ﬁrm i is involved.
The ﬁrst term between brackets represents the change in the ﬂows from ﬁrm i to other ﬁrms
as a consequence of ﬁrm i raising its price. The second term between brackets indicates the
ﬂows to ﬁrm i from other ﬁrms as a consequence of ﬁrm i raising its price. These ﬂows can
occur only from one of the 14 other ﬁrms which held a regional monopoly in 1993.
Next we substitute Fij for Sij using the following equation (this follows directly from the
definition of Fij in Eqs. 1–3):
Fij = 100 · Sij/Qi,1993 (6)
where Fij = Fi→j,j =i,s e eE q .1
 Qi/ Pi =
Qi,1993
100
⎡
⎣
j=20  
j=1,j =i
Fij/ Pi −
k=15  
k=1,k =i
Fki/ Pi
⎤
⎦ (7)
Since we are interested in the elasticity for an average ﬁrm, we replace Qi,1993 by Q∗,
deﬁned as the number of insured of the average incumbent ﬁrm. Furthermore we can calcu-
late dFij/dPi and dFki/dPi in Eq. 7 by differentiating Eqs. 1–3 with respect to price. Using
the fact that the ﬁrst term in Eq. 7 is a summation over 19 identical terms while the second
term is a summation over 14 identical terms we arrive at the following equation:
 Qi/ Pi =
Q∗
100
⎡
⎣
j=20  
j=1,j =i
φj,price −
k=15  
k=1,j =i
−φj,price
⎤
⎦ =
33φpriceQ∗
100
(8)
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where φprice=the (sum of the) estimated coefﬁcient(s) on price in Eqs. 1–3 for the relevant
group; for example, for 25–34year old working males, we would add up the coefﬁcients on
the price for this age group and the coefﬁcient on gender.
Substituting(8)in(4)anddroppingthesubscripti (sinceweareinterestedintheelasticity
for the average ﬁrm) yields:
ε = 33 · P · φprice/100 (9)
Thiselasticity canbeusedtoanswerthefollowingquestion:howmuchsmaller (in%)would
the number of insured of an average ﬁrm have been in 2002, if its average price during the
period 1996–2002 had been 1% higher, assuming all other ﬁrms had kept their prices at the
observed level?
Results
Estimated coefﬁcients
We report results based on WLS (weighted least squares) since diagnostic tests indicate het-
eroskedasticity in most cases. The main effect of using WLS instead of OLS is a substantial
increase in t-values.8
Table 9showstheestimationresultsforequationswithtotalpremiumasthepricevariable,
while Table 10 shows the estimation results for equations with the basic and supplementary
insurance as separate explanatory variables. In order to avoid cluttering of tables we do not
report estimated coefﬁcients on ﬁrm speciﬁc coefﬁcients or intercepts. We also omit the
coefﬁcient for new entrants (NEW), which was always significantly negative.
In all equations we ﬁnd that the probability of switching falls with age and is larger for
men than for women: this is in line with the descriptive statistics reported above.
Turning to the estimated coefﬁcients for price, we ﬁnd that including ﬁrm speciﬁc coef-
ﬁcients matters a great deal, in particular for supplementary insurance. Quite strikingly,
including coefﬁcients for regional entrants leads to insignificant results for total and sup-
plementary insurance but not for basic insurance. This points to omitted ﬁrm characteristics
and/or heterogeneity in the quality (probably coverage) of supplementary insurance. On the
other hand, one fairly robust ﬁnding is the significantly negative coefﬁcient on the price of
basic insurance. In general, we ﬁnd plausible age patterns: the estimated coefﬁcient is larger
in absolute term for younger enrollees. In equations where we distinguish between basic and
supplementary insurance, we ﬁnd that men are more sensitive to price than women.
Choosing between models
In order to choose between the six estimated models, we performed two sets of F-tests:
• First,wedeterminedwhetherthemodelwithoutﬁrmspeciﬁcconstantsisrejectedinfavour
of models with ﬁrm speciﬁc constants; this was always the case.
8 By construction, the dependent variable lies between 0 and 100. In our data, all bilateral ﬂows are a small
percentageofthecustomerbaseofeachinsurer.However,therearequiteafewzero’sinourbilateralﬂowdata.
Hence a Tobit speciﬁcation allowing for zero-censoring might seem more appropriate than WLS. However,
Tobit estimates turn out to be close to the WLS estimates reported here. Moreover, although predictions of
negative ﬂows are in principle possible, in this case that does not pose a problem since a negative predicted
ﬂow simply means a predicted ﬂow in the opposite direction of the actual ﬂow.
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Table 9 Estimation results, total premium, WLS
Variable No ﬁrm speciﬁc
constants
With ﬁrm speciﬁc
constants αi
With ﬁrm speciﬁc
constants αj
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
AGE 35–44 −0.338 −2.466 −0.115 −1.953 −0.116 −3.222
AGE 45–55 −0.493 −3.703 −0.170 −2.885 −0.181 −5.195
AGE 55–64 −0.625 −4.906 −0.233 −4.052 −0.230 −6.845
MALE 0.341 4.186 0.125 3.319 0.061 3.103
AGE 25–34(Pj − Pi) −0.009 −2.718 −0.006 −3.367 0.000 0.194
AGE 35–44(Pj − Pi) −0.006 −2.329 −0.004 −2.464 0.001 0.950
AGE 45–54(Pj − Pi) −0.006 −2.439 −0.003 −2.125 0.001 1.292
AGE 55–64(Pj − Pi) −0.006 −2.852 −0.002 −1.580 0.001 2.294
MALE(Pj − Pi) −0.003 −1.463 −0.002 −1.487 −0.001 −1.075
Adj R2 0.034 0.211 0.305
N 2128 2128 2128
Table 10 Estimation results, basic and supplementary premium, WLS
Variable No ﬁrm speciﬁc
constants
With ﬁrm speciﬁc
constants αi
With ﬁrm speciﬁc
constants αj
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
AGE 35–44 −0.340 −2.559 −0.114 −1.901 −0.140 −3.711
AGE 45–55 −0.499 −3.865 −0.172 −2.875 −0.213 −5.838
AGE 55–64 −0.630 −5.100 −0.233 −4.005 −0.266 −7.377
MALE 0.345 4.259 0.125 3.298 0.060 2.827
AGE 25–34(PB
j − PB
i ) −0.008 −1.415 −0.006 −2.514 −0.008 −4.479
AGE 35–44(PB
j − PB
i ) −0.005 −0.953 −0.003 −1.704 −0.004 −3.488
AGE 45–54(PB
j − PB
i ) −0.005 −1.160 −0.003 −1.470 −0.003 −2.336
AGE 55–64(PB
j − PB
i ) −0.002 −0.438 −0.002 −1.052 −0.002 −1.694
MALE(PB
j − PB
i ) −0.009 −2.142 −0.002 −0.922 0.000 0.420
AGE 25–34(PS
j − PS
i ) −0.009 −2.791 −0.007 −3.727 0.001 1.107
AGE 35–44(PS
j − PS
i ) −0.006 −2.547 −0.005 −3.123 0.001 1.823
AGE 45–54 (PS
j − PS
i ) −0.006 −2.575 −0.004 −2.834 0.001 1.812
AGE 55–64(PS
j − PS
i ) −0.007 −3.436 −0.004 −2.555 0.001 2.455
MALE(PS
j − PS
i ) −0.002 −0.766 −0.002 −1.362 −0.001 −1.117
Adj R2 0.0385 0.2074 0.3126
N 2128 2128 2128
• Second,weassessedwhetherequalityofcoefﬁcientsonbasicandsupplementarypremium
is rejected in favour of including these as two separate explanatory variables; this was also
the case.
Therefore, on statistical grounds we are able to narrow the number of models down to just
two:withseparatepricevariablesbasicandsupplementarypremium,eitherwithﬁrmspeciﬁc
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Table 11 Elasticities
Based on equations including αi Based on equations including αj
Women Men Women Men
Elasticity t-value Elasticity t-value Elasticity t-value Elasticity t-value
Basic insurance
Age 25–34 −0.30 −2.51 −0.38 −1.84 −0.41 −4.48 −0.39 −2.68
Age 35–44 −0.17 −1.70 −0.25 −1.34 −0.22 −3.49 −0.19 −1.70
Age 45–55 −0.14 −1.47 −0.22 −1.21 −0.15 −2.34 −0.12 −1.08
Age 55–64 −0.10 −1.05 −0.18 −0.99 −0.10 −1.69 −0.08 −0.72
Supplementary insurance
Age 25–34 −0.18 −3.73 −0.22 −2.81 0.03 1.11 0.01 0.28
Age 35–44 −0.13 −3.12 −0.17 −2.37 0.03 1.82 0.01 0.43
Age 45–55 −0.12 −2.83 −0.16 −2.20 0.03 1.81 0.01 0.40
Age 55–64 −0.10 −2.55 −0.14 −2.03 0.04 2.46 0.02 0.72
Note: t-values calculated using the delta method
constants for former regional monopolists (αi) or with ﬁrm speciﬁc constants for ﬁrms that
are new to the region (αj).9
Sensitivity checks
In order to test the robustness of our ﬁndings to changes in the underlying assumptions, we
didtwosensitivitychecks.First,inselectingthemunicipalitiestobeincludedintheanalysis,
we raised the cut-off point from 60% to 75% (see section “Data and method”). This lead to
discarding 1,39 million observations and slightly higher (and statistically more significant)
estimates. Second, rather than using average prices for the period 1993–2002 we included
average prices for the period 2000–2002. Again this yielded essentially the same results,
which is consistent with the fact reported in section “Data and method” that differences in
premium tend to be stable over time.
Elasticities
Table 11 presents elasticity estimates for our preferred speciﬁcations. We ﬁnd plausible age
effects: estimated elasticities fall (in absolute value) with age. Also we ﬁnd consistently that
men are more responsive to price than are women. Perhaps the most striking result is that
theseelasticitiesaresosmall.Recallthattheseelasticitiesmeasurethecumulativeeffectafter
7years of keeping price 1% above the price of competitors. However, this does not means
that we can derive annual elasticities simply by dividing the elasticities reported in Table 11
by 7. Some insured may have switched to another ﬁrm early on (say in 1997), and stayed
with that ﬁrm because this turned out to be the right choice in following years. Given the
high correlation of prices over time noticed in section “Data and method”, this is a plausible
scenario. This reasoning suggests that the elasticities in Table 11 should be interpreted as an
upper limit for the annual elasticity.
We should also point out that, since we are restricting our data to those who were insured
continuously during the period 1993–2002, we are omitting new customers: new entrants to
9 Looking at the adjusted R-squared, the equations with αj consistently have the highest explanatory power.
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the labour market and the self-employed. These groups are likely to be more price-sensitive
(Schut et al. 2003).
Conclusions
The price elasticity of residual demand is an important empirical measure of the intensity
of competition in a market. Obtaining reliable estimates for this elasticity requires paneldata
that are often not available. By using changes in the regulatory setting of Dutch health insur-
ance, we were able to construct a set of paneldata on the bilateral ﬂows of insured between
each pair of health insurance ﬁrms in the Netherlands. This results in a far richer dataset for
estimatingpriceelasticitiesthenhadbeenavailablethusfar.Ourresultsindicatethattheprice
elasticity of residual demand for social health insurance was low during the period 1996–
2002, conﬁrming earlier ﬁndings based on annual changes in market share. We ﬁnd small
but significant elasticities for basic insurance but insignificant elasticities for supplementary
insurance. Young enrollees are more price sensitive than older enrollees.
We had to make a number of assumptions in order to be able to estimate price elasticities
from the data at hand. Although we believe that these assumptions are justiﬁable, they are
notliterallycorrectforallourobservations.Asaresult,ourestimatesmaybebiased.Clearly,
it would have been preferable to work with real paneldata, but these are not available for the
bilateral ﬂows we are interested in.
The main policy implication of our ﬁnding is that competition was weak in the market for
health insurance during the study period. Recent experience seems to contradict this ﬁnding.
In 2006, the year of the introduction of the new health insurance law, the number of insured
switching health insurers increased to almost 20% of the Dutch population. However, this
switching rate is likely to be an all-time high phenomenon, due to the fact that all citizens
faced a drastically changed health insurance policy and many of them got the option to join a
groupcontract.Indeed,in2007thenumberofswitchersfellagaintolessthan5%.Therefore,
an active government policy to facilitate consumer choice by lowering search and switch-
ing costs (e.g. by providing consumer information and by standardizing switching rules and
procedures) is likely to be needed to support competition in the health insurance market.
OpenAccess ThisarticleisdistributedunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttributionNoncommercial
License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author(s) and source are credited.
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